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The present study examines whether social interference (i.e., interference with one’s goal attainment by 
the bodily presence of others) depletes the limited resource of self-control strength. In an experimental 
laboratory study (N = 34), half the participants experienced social interference whereas the other half did 
not experience social interference by two confederates during a dexterity task. Afterwards, we measured 
participants’ momentary self-control strength applying a Stroop colour-naming task. In line with our pre-
diction, participants’ performance in the Stroop task indicated that social interference reduced self-control 
strength. We discuss implications for crowding research and crowding in natural settings. 
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Introduction 
The presence of other people frequently interferes with indi-
vidual goals: In crowded pedestrian zones, other people may 
walk in front, stand in the way, or walk across one’s projected 
path; in busy supermarkets, other people may block access to 
shelves containing desired goods. When this happens, individu-
als are forced to coordinate their own movement with that of 
others, make avoidance movements, adjust their speed, or wait. 
This may be exhausting, especially when it interferes with the 
completion of goals (e.g., keeping an appointment or quickly 
doing the shopping). The present research aims to show that 
adaptation to such social interference is associated with self- 
regulatory costs. We assume that social interference requires 
self-control and, therefore, depletes the resource underlying 
self-control, which in turn is expected to lead to reduced per-
formance in subsequent self-control demands. 
Our conceptualisation of social interference is based on 
Schopler and Stockdale’s (1977) definition of social interfer-
ence in crowding: “The presence of others is interfering when-
ever they restrict, disrupt, or block goal-oriented response se-
quences” (p. 82). Emanating from this early definition, in the 
present work we perceive social interference as an immediate 
interference with a person’s goal attainment by the bodily 
presence of other persons. In particular, we focus on the case in 
which others physically block individuals’ moving paths with 
their bodies, thereby impairing individuals in moving from 
place A to place B (i.e., attainment of a physical goal). Such 
interference with a physical goal may often be related to inter-
ference with a psychological goal; for instance, when a person 
who is in a hurry to keep an important appointment is slowed 
down by others in a crowded pedestrian zone. Social interfer-
ence, as we conceptualise it, is primarily characterised by 
physical interaction in contrast to psychological interaction: 
Someone can block another person’s way (physical interaction) 
without noticing it, so that communication between the two 
persons (psychological interaction) does not take place. Par-
ticularly in cities, social interference may be an integral part of 
everyday life (e.g., in pedestrian zones, in shops, and in railway 
stations). 
We offer a new perspective to the phenomenon of social in-
terference by analysing it in light of an established self-control 
model (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Baumeis-
ter, 2000). Self-control means the overriding, or inhibition, of 
one’s own automatic, habitual, or innate behavioural tendencies 
in order to pursue long-term goals or to act in line with stan-
dards such as social norms (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Mu-
raven & Baumeister, 2000). In other words, self-control enables 
people to alter their predominant responses in service of higher 
goals instead of acting on the spur of the moment. For instance, 
if a person’s goal is to lose weight (a higher goal), that person 
has to suppress naturally occurring eating impulses (self-con- 
trol). Lack of self-control implies impulsive behaviour (e.g., 
eating chocolate) and impedes longer term goal fulfilment (e.g., 
losing weight). 
In the past years, a strength model explaining when and why 
self-control succeeds or fails has received a great deal of atten-
tion and has been empirically confirmed in various experiments 
(for reviews, see Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister et al., 2007; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). According to the strength 
model of self-control, exertion of self-control depletes a limited 
strength resource required for the successful exertion of self- 
control. Therefore, individuals who have recently used this 
resource subsequently have less self-control strength available 
(a state coined ego depletion) compared to individuals who 
have not recently exerted self-control; thus, the former are less 
successful in exerting self-control than the latter. Potential al-
ternative explanations, such as differences in mood or self- 
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efficacy, do not seem to be responsible for this depletion effect 
(Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Wallace & Baumeister, 
2002). An important aspect of the strength model is that differ-
ent kinds of self-control are assumed to rely on the same 
strength resource, even if the required behaviours are in widely 
different domains. For instance, participants who were asked to 
suppress a certain thought were subsequently less successful in 
suppressing their emotional expressions compared to partici-
pants who were not initially asked to control their thoughts 
(Muraven et al., 1998: Study 3). Experimentally varying the 
self-control demands for participants in an initial task and then 
assessing participants’ self-control performance in a second 
task has become the basic approach for the examination of the 
determinants and consequences of momentarily available self- 
control strength (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
Although initially focusing on intra-personal events, several 
studies in the last years have examined how interpersonal 
events affect self-control. Some of these studies examined the 
effects of a lack of social interaction. For instance, Baumeister, 
DeWall, Ciarocco, and Twenge (2005) found that social exclu-
sion caused decrements in self-control. In their study, people 
who were informed that no one wanted to work with them later 
ate twice as many chocolate cookies than participants who had 
not been rejected. However, the other extreme of social interac-
tion—too much contact or input, such as the kind of social in-
terference we experience in shopping malls or in crowded pe-
destrian zones—might also have detrimental effects on self- 
control.  
Much earlier, Glass and Singer (1972) came up with the idea 
that adaptation to the physical environment can have “psychic 
costs”. In their laboratory experiments, participants who were 
exposed to uncontrollable noise showed decreased performance 
in subsequent tasks that were akin to current measures of 
self-control (e.g., persistence and overriding of impulses to quit 
during a frustrating task; see Baumeister et al., 2007). Glass and 
Singer interpreted their results as evidence that adaptation to 
uncontrollable circumstances requires psychic resources that 
will be missing in subsequent tasks. This interpretation is in 
line with the more recent strength model of self-control (Bau-
meister et al., 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), in which 
such psychic costs are referred to as depleted self-control 
strength. Similar to the noise in Glass and Singer’s work, social 
interference may be seen as uncontrollable since normally it 
may be difficult, if not impossible, to control how other persons 
will move (e.g., in a shop or a pedestrian zone). Hence, we 
assume that exposure to social interference, similar to exposure 
to uncontrollable noise, will cause decrements in subsequent 
self-control by depleting self-control strength. 
But why is it that social interference supposedly impairs 
self-control? In social interference situations, a person’s goal- 
directed movements are interfered with and, therefore, need to 
be adjusted. This adjustment involves the overriding of origi-
nally intended responses (i.e., self-control), such as altering 
intended movements (deviating from the direct path, slowing 
one’s movements down) or suppressing intended movements 
(waiting) in order to avoid colliding with other persons. Thus, 
exposure to social interference should tax the limited resource 
of self-control strength, which should result in less self-control 
strength for later use. If people faced with social interference 
did not exert self-control by adjusting their movements, quite 
often they would find themselves in violation of social norms 
(e.g., colliding with others), which is generally undesirable. 
Indirect evidence that social interference may impair self- 
control stems from Heller, Groff, and Solomon (1977). They 
experimentally manipulated spatial density as well as the de-
mand to move about the lab while performing tasks, such as 
sorting pages in a booklet and adding up numbers. When par-
ticipants were in a dense situation and had to move about to 
perform the tasks (i.e., physical interaction was high and inter-
fered with the task goals), they showed decreased performance 
during the tasks. One possible explanation of this finding might 
be that dealing with social interference in this condition de-
pleted participants’ self-control strength, which, as a result, 
negatively affected their self-control of thoughts and attention 
(i.e., concentration; see Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). 
However, no direct evidence of this explanation is available to 
date. In a field study along the lines of Heller et al.’s laboratory 
experiment, Langer and Saegert (1977) asked participants to 
move through a busy versus a non-busy department store while 
performing a complex cognitive-behavioural task requiring 
concentration. In relation to the comparison group, participants 
who moved through the busy environment experienced more 
people obstructing their way while they tried to perform the 
task; that is, they experienced more social interference. These 
participants also performed worse than the participants in the 
comparison group. Again, one potential explanation for the 
lowered performance might be that dealing with the demands of 
social interference led to depletion of self-control strength. 
Although Heller et al.’s (1977) as well as Langer and Sae- 
gert’s (1977) findings are compatible with our assumption that 
social interference has adverse effects on self-control, they do 
not constitute sufficient evidence. Because the tasks were per-
formed during the experience of social interference in suppos-
edly highly sensory-demanding environments, increased cogni-
tive load rather than reduced self-control strength might have 
impaired performance in these tasks. Theoretically, a key dif-
ference between the self-control model and cognitive capacity 
models is that self-control depletion lasts beyond the situation 
and can be measured after the concurrent cognitive demands 
have ceased (Muraven et al., 1998). Therefore, it would be 
desirable to test whether effects on task performance last even 
after the social interaction. There is one set of studies that has 
applied the strength model of self-control to test the af-
ter-effects of social interactions (Finkel et al., 2006). Finkel et 
al. found that poorly coordinated interactions that required ad-
ditional adjustment beyond the actual task participants were 
working on with a confederate subsequently caused poorer 
self-control. However, this study examined interaction tasks 
jointly performed by two individuals (e.g., entering data to-
gether, navigating a computer maze) rather than the effects of 
physical blocking outside of direct interactions. Thus, Finkel et 
al. examined a kind of social interaction quite different from 
our conceptualisation of social interference. We focus more on 
the observation that people are also moving objects in space 
and that, as such, they can block one others’ paths. 
In sum, there is evidence that adaptation to an uncontrollable 
physical environment (here: uncontrollable noise) subsequently 
leads to poorer self-control (Glass & Singer, 1972), that social 
interference has detrimental effects on performance in tasks that 
involve self-control (Heller et al., 1977; Langer & Saegert, 
1977), and that social interactions which require adjustment 
impair subsequent self-control by reducing self-control strength 
(Finkel et al., 2006). Up to now, however, no study exists that 
has shown detrimental effects of social interference on self- 
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control after the interference situation has ended, thus ruling out 
a cognitive capacity explanation. So, in the present study, we 
aimed to directly test the hypothesis of whether social interfer-
ence depletes self-control strength. 
We conducted an experimental laboratory study in which 
participants engaged in a task (filling a jug with water using a 
spoon) while experiencing or not experiencing social interfer-
ence through two confederates. Afterwards, we used response 
latencies in a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) to measure momentar-
ily available self-control strength, as in previous studies (e.g., 
Richeson & Shelton, 2003): Participants were asked to name 
the print colours of non-corresponding colour words (e.g., the 
word BLUE printed in yellow). This requires participants to 
suppress the highly automated response to read the words and 
replace it by naming the printed colours instead; that is, par-
ticipants have to exert self-control. Performance in the Stroop 
task should therefore be impaired if self-control strength has 
previously been depleted. We expected that participants in the 
social interference condition would have longer response laten-
cies for completing the Stroop task than participants in the con-
trol condition who had not experienced social interference. This 
pattern would indicate that dealing with social interference has 
costs in terms of the depletion of self-control strength. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
The sample included 34 undergraduates enrolled at a univer-
sity in Southern Germany (28 females, mean age = 23.8). We 
excluded three additional participants from analyses who ex-
pressed severe doubts about the cover story and one who exhib-
ited extremely low motivation to follow the instructions (re-
ported by the confederates and the participant himself); how-
ever, the same pattern of results emerged when these partici-
pants were included. All students participated voluntarily and 
received chocolate as a reward. The participants were randomly 
assigned to two conditions: In the experimental condition (n = 
18), their movements were systematically obstructed by two 
female confederates (social interference); in the control condi-
tion (n = 16), their movements were not obstructed (no social 
interference). 
Materials and Procedure 
The students were asked to participate in a study concerning 
the interplay between cognition and coordination. Participants 
were tested individually (together with the two confederates) in 
sessions lasting approximately twenty minutes. Upon arrival to 
the laboratory, participants were told that the study involved 
groups of three people. The confederates were placed standing 
in different corners of the room and appeared to be unknown to 
each other (one was looking through her diary; the other was 
busy with her mobile phone).  
Next the experimenter presented the cover story, which 
stated that recent neuropsychological studies had found close 
connections between brain areas responsible for body coordina-
tion and fluid intelligence, and that this relation could be tested 
using behavioural measures. Ostensibly, a formula had been 
developed to assess fluid intelligence through performance in 
an unpractised dexterity task, with the aim of collecting data on 
this relation. The experimenter emphasised the importance of 
fluid intelligence for academic success in order to make the task 
more relevant for the participants.  
After this, the task was explained. Participant and confeder-
ates were instructed to fill a spoon with water at a sink within 
the laboratory room and to balance until its contents were de-
livered to an individually assigned jug. They were told to repeat 
this procedure until the experimenter returned. The experi-
menter pointed out that the amount of water in the jug would 
become the numerical value to be entered into the fluid intelli-
gence formula (a measuring container and a funnel were visibly 
placed in the room). Participant and confederates were also 
instructed not to speak during the task (cf. Heller et al., 1977). 
After the instructions, the experimenter gave the start signal and 
immediately left the room. The reason why the experimenter 
was not present during this phase of the experiment was to give 
participants in the social interference condition no possibility to 
complain to the experimenter (e.g., about the confederates’ 
behaviour). 
The manipulation of the independent variable took place 
during the dexterity task. The direct path between sink and jugs 
was narrow due to tables standing sideways, allowing only one 
person through at a time. In the social interference condition, 
the confederates used this path exclusively so that the fastest 
way was systematically obstructed for the participant, forcing 
the participant to regularly adjust his or her movement (i.e., 
stop and wait, step aside). Furthermore, the confederates posi-
tioned themselves near the sink at the beginning of the task. 
Therefore, the confederates were faster to the sink than the 
participant for the first time they filled their spoons; as a con-
sequence, the participant’s access to the sink was frequently 
blocked during the course of the task, so that the participant had 
to repeatedly interrupt the intended goal-directed movement 
and wait. In contrast, in the control condition the confederates 
took a longer route around the tables so that they did not inter-
fere with the participant’s movements. In addition, they surrep-
titiously arranged their speed so that they arrived at the sink 
after the participant; thus, the participant did not have to wait. 
After five minutes, the experimenter returned and interrupted 
the activity. The experimenter announced that another measure 
had to be taken individually and asked the participant to be 
tested first. The confederates were asked to wait in a room next 
to the lab. The participant then received 280 incongruent Stroop 
stimuli on paper (i.e. the word did not correspond to the colour 
in which it was printed, e.g., the word BLUE was printed in 
yellow). We used blue, green, red, and yellow as colour words 
as well as print colours. This task was introduced to the par-
ticipant as a measure of mental flexibility and the participant 
was instructed to name aloud the print colours of the words as 
fast as possible while avoiding any mistakes. The time the par-
ticipant took to name all Stroop stimuli and the number of mis-
takes made was recorded by the experimenter. 
Afterwards, the participant rated the perceived interference 
during the dexterity task on two items (“How much did the 
other participants obstruct you with attaining the task goal?”, 
“How often were the other participants standing in your way?”). 
On one-item measures, they also rated the amount of effort 
invested in the dexterity task as well as in the Stroop task, the 
personal importance of performing well in each of these tasks, 
the amount of frustration that was experienced during the dex-
terity task, and the extent of negative feelings that were experi-
enced towards the confederates. All these ratings were made on 
7-point Likert scales. Finally, the participants were thanked, 
probed for suspicion, rewarded, and debriefed. Also each con-
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federate rated on one-item measures how much the participant 
was obstructed as well as how motivated, how frustrated, and 
how aggressive the participant appeared during the dexterity 
task on 6-point Likert scales. Participant and confederate rat-
ings were coded such that higher scores indicated higher values 
of the respective variable. The confederates’ ratings for each 
participant were averaged across both confederates. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
For the comparisons of means between the two experimental 
groups, we applied independent-samples t-tests. Since the par-
ticipants’ two ratings on perceived interference were highly 
correlated, r = .83, p < .001, we averaged them. Both partici-
pants (M = 5.11, SD = 1.55 vs. M = 2.56, SD = 1.46), t(32) = 
4.92, p < .001, d = 1.69 and confederates (M = 5.61, SD = 0.74 
vs. M = 1.22, SD = 0.26), t(32) = 22.57, p < .001, d = 7.73 re-
ported more perceived social interference in the social interfer-
ence condition than in the control condition. Participants also 
transported less water to the jug in the social interference con-
dition than in the control condition (M = 83.17 ml, SD = 15.50 
vs. M = 153.88 ml, SD = 28.22), t(32) = −9.20, p < .001, d = 
−3.16. Altogether, these findings indicate that the social inter-
ference manipulation was successful. 
Stroop Performance 
We conducted an independent-samples t-test with the ex-
perimental condition (social interference vs. no social interfer-
ence) as an independent variable and time required for com-
pleting the Stroop task as a dependent variable. As expected, 
participants who had experienced social interference during the 
dexterity task took statistically significantly longer in the 
Stroop task (M = 310.28 s, SD = 59.75 s) than participants who 
had not experienced social interference (M = 264.88 s, SD = 
40.53 s), t(32) = 2.56, p = .02, d = 0.88. Participants in the so-
cial interference condition took, on average, 45 sec. longer to 
complete the Stroop task than participants in the control condi-
tion without social interference. The number of errors made in 
the Stroop task did not differ between conditions, t(32) < 1. 
Thus, a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot account for the finding 
on time required for completing the Stroop task. 
Supplementary Analyses 
There were no differences between experimental conditions 
regarding participants’ ratings of invested effort and importance 
of performance in the dexterity task or in the Stroop task, and 
the confederate ratings of participants’ motivation or aggression 
during the dexterity task (ps > .25). Ratings of the personal 
importance of performance in the dexterity task were high (M = 
6.00, SD = 0.84 in the social interference condition; M = 6.06, 
SD = 0.93 in the no social interference condition; maximum 
possible score = 7.00), indicating that participants in both ex-
perimental conditions were motivated to achieve the goal dur-
ing the dexterity task. 
Participants in the social interference condition did not rate 
the dexterity task as being more frustrating than did participants 
in the control condition, t(32) < 1. However, the confederates 
perceived the participants in the social interference condition as 
more frustrated (M = 1.47, SD = 0.70) than the participants in 
the control condition (M = 1.03, SD = 0.13), t(32) = 2.50, p 
= .02, d = 0.85. Moreover, participants in the social interference 
condition tended to report more negative feelings towards the 
confederates (M = 3.22, SD = 1.70) than did participants in the 
control condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.35), t(32) = 1.71, p = .10, d 
= 0.59. Neither participants’ frustration as perceived by the 
confederates, r = .17, p = .34, nor participants’ negative feel-
ings towards the confederates r = −.01, p = .94 correlated with 
the time participants took to complete the Stroop task. Thus, the 
performance decrements in the social interference condition 
were not attributable to these variables. 
Discussion 
The present research aimed to demonstrate that exposure to 
social interference reduces self-control strength and, hence, 
impairs subsequent self-control. In our study, the goal-directed 
movements of one group of participants were obstructed by the 
physical presence of two confederates (i.e., social interference), 
forcing them to adjust their intended movements. Such adjust-
ment was assumed to involve self-control and to consume 
self-control strength that would subsequently be lacking in later 
self-control demands. We found that participants who experi-
enced this social interference during a dexterity task took 
longer in a subsequent Stroop colour-naming task than partici-
pants who did not experience social interference. This finding 
was not attributable to a speed-accuracy trade-off as well as 
participants’ task motivation, feelings of frustration, or negative 
affect towards the confederates. Since response latencies in the 
Stroop task have been shown to depend on self-control strength 
(e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2003), our study provides initial 
evidence for the assumption that social interference draws on 
the resource necessary for successful self-control, indicating 
that exposure to social interference can cause decrements in 
self-control. 
On the one hand, our findings may provide a novel theoreti-
cal explanation of crowding effects. Prior to our study, no direct 
evidence was available that self-control might be taxed by 
crowding. Since social interference has been argued to be cen-
tral in crowding (Schopler & Stockdale, 1977), the present 
findings suggest that it may be worthwhile to investigate 
self-control processes further, as an explanation of observed 
effects of crowding. As we have already mentioned in the intro- 
duction, Heller et al.’s (1977) as well as Langer and Saegert’s 
(1977) findings on reduced task performance in crowded situa-
tions may, at least in part, be determined by diminished self- 
control strength stemming from exposure to social interference. 
Further evidence that effects of crowding may be attributed to 
reduced self-control strength comes from studies on helping 
behaviour: A recent study that was theoretically based on the 
strength model of self-control demonstrated that initial deple-
tion of self-control strength subsequently decreased participants’ 
willingness to help others (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & 
Maner, 2008). This corresponds to a finding in the crowding 
literature that participants who had experienced a crowded 
situation were less helpful to someone in need than were par-
ticipants who had experienced a less crowded situation (Cohen 
& Spacapan, 1978). 
On the other hand, the present research extends self-control 
research, particularly with reference to the important questions 
of why and when people fail in self-control. Extending eviden- 
ce on the adverse effects on self-control after social exclusion 
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(Baumeister et al., 2005), positive self-presentation (Vohs, Bau- 
meister, & Ciarocco, 2005), or poorly coordinated dyadic con-
versation (Finkel et al., 2006), social interference seems to tax 
self-control resources as well. So, our study provides a new pie- 
ce to the mosaic that makes up the costly demands of social life. 
One central limitation of the present study is its lack of ex-
ternal validity, which is typical for laboratory experiments. 
Participants were confronted with an artificial setting that was 
different from natural situations in which social interference 
may occur. Therefore it cannot be excluded that the decrement 
in Stroop performance was caused by characteristics specific to 
the circumstances in our investigation. It might be possible, for 
instance, that the adjustment of movements is much more 
automatic in natural settings, such as in a pedestrian zone, than 
during an unfamiliar dexterity task in a lab room. That is, since 
exertion of automatic behaviours should not require self-control 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), social interference would not 
lead to diminished self-control strength outside the laboratory. 
However, the field study by Langer and Saegert (1977) we 
mentioned in the introduction indicates that social interference 
can impair performance in complex tasks, even in natural set-
tings. Although Langer and Saegert’s study does not provide 
sufficient evidence to confirm our specific self-control hypo- 
thesis, it gives us some confidence that social interference may 
have adverse after-effects on self-control in real-life situations. 
Still, one important avenue for future research when following 
up on our initial findings would be to apply the present ap-
proach to more natural settings. 
 What implications can be drawn from the results? Basi-
cally, after the experience of social interference, people should 
be more likely to fail in self-control. There are numerous ex-
amples in every-day life in which this may matter. For instance, 
exposure to social interference in a shopping mall could poten-
tially lead to impulse buying. Vohs and Faber (2007) demon-
strated that participants whose self-control strength had recently 
been depleted felt stronger urges to buy, were willing to spend 
more money, and actually spent more money compared to par-
ticipant whose self-control strength was intact. Hence, crowded 
shopping malls, in which social interference is quite likely to 
occur, might contribute to higher spending. Since the ability to 
resist other temptations such as delicious but unhealthy food 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) or alcohol 
(Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002) also relies on the mo-
mentary availability of self-control strength, people are sup-
posed to be more likely to give in to these temptations after 
social interference. Many temptations (e.g., fast food, candies, 
beer) are easily available in pedestrian zones and shopping 
malls, and unfortunately these places are frequently crowded. 
Future research could also try to expand the scope of the social 
interference–self-control relationship to traffic congestion. In 
key aspects, driving a car through the city during rush hour 
provides a similar interference situation as in the present re-
search: Paths and goals are blocked and movements of feet and 
hands have to be adjusted. However, loss of self-control while 
driving a car could have dangerous and potentially fatal conse-
quences. 
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